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ABSTRACT
Microbial technologies often serve as the basis of fundamental research tools in molecular biology. These present a variety
of ethical, legal and social issues concerning their patenting. This commentary presents several case studies of these issues
across three major microbiological tools: CRISPR, viral vectors and antimicrobial resistance drugs. It concludes that the
development of these technologies—both scientifically and commercially—depend, in part, on the patent regime available
for each, and researchers’ willingness to enforce those patents against others.
Keywords: patents; CRISPR; virus; AMR; incentives

INTRODUCTION
Microbiology has long served as both the source of and inspiration for fundamental research tools in molecular biology. Viral
vectors, antimicrobial drugs and, of course, CRISPR-Cas9 are all,
today, workhorses of molecular biology derived from microorganisms. But these tools also straddle the line between basic
and applied research; between instruments of scientific inquiry
and commercial commodities. Consequently, researchers have
long been patenting these tools and their derivatives. This commentary reviews the historical landscape of patent protection
for microbial biotechnology, along with several ethical, legal and
social issues surrounding patent protection for microbiology. In
short, patents covering microbial technology both encourage the
development of research tools and contribute to excesses of enforcement.

CRISPR
CRISPR (clustered regularly interspace short palindromic repeats) is a revolutionary genetic editing technology first discovered in Streptococcus pyogenes in 2012 (Jinek et al. 2012;
Gasiunas et al. 2012). Precise, easy, cheap and flexible, most engineered forms of CRISPR require only two components: a CRISPR

nuclease, such as the archetype Cas9, and a single guide RNA
(sgRNA) complementary to the genomic target. The technology
has been so widely hailed by scientists that it is now cliché to refer to it, as Giedrius Gasiunas and Virginijus Siksnys did in 2013,
as the ‘Holy Grail’ of molecular biology (Gasiunas and Siksnys
2013). The technology is also the subject of a contentious patent
dispute between the University of California, Berkeley (USA) and
the Broad Institute (USA) (Sherkow 2017).
CRISPR patents cover basic forms of the technology, including any genome-editing system using a prepackaged
Cas9:sgRNA ribonucleoprotein complex (U.S. Patent No.
9,637,739). Some more recently issued CRISPR patents cover
specific applications of the technology, such as Cellectis’s patent
claiming the use of endogenously expressed CRISPR components for chimeric antigen receptor T-cell immunotherapy
(European Patent No. 3,004,337). Legal scholars have accordingly
questioned whether these fundamental patents are drawn
narrowly enough to permit sufficient experimentation and
development (Contreras and Sherkow 2017).
Fortunately, academic research has not been hampered by
the explosion of CRISPR patents—as demonstrated by the thousands of CRISPR research papers since 2012. Europe provides
robust immunity from patent infringement for basic academic
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VIRAL VECTORS
Microbiologists have also relied on viruses as basic tools of research (Flint et al. 2015). And viruses are, too, objects of study
themselves. Since the cloning of the first viral particle—a poliovirus plasmid in 1981—viruses have become an indispensable tool for molecular biologists (Flint et al. 2015). But the
nature of viruses—as defined by the sequence of their genome—
has raised, and continues to raise, significant issues concerning
patents’ availability for and their enforcement in vaccine development.
Researchers have been patenting viruses for decades
(Sherkow and Greely 2015). Perhaps the most famous example concerns Stephen E. Wright’s patents covering variants of
Prague Avian Sarcoma Virus (PrASV) (Canady 1994). Wright
waged a multiyear, partially successful effort to patent both
the native form of PrASV, as well as processes of using it
to provoke immune responses (In re Wright 1993). Wright’s
case stands as an exemplar of both the difficulties in patenting viruses and inventor overreach (Lang 2003). More recently,
Monsanto Co. has obtained patents on several forms of baculoviruses for plant transfection (Rogers 2013), while lentiviral
transfection systems are now subject to hundreds of patents
across the globe (Picanço-Castro, de Sousa Russo-Carbolante
and Covas 2012).
At the same time, the genetic nature of viruses continues to
present challenges. The United States recently eliminated the
patenting of ‘isolated and purified’ genetic products in a widely
watched Supreme Court case. Europe, however, continues to allow the patenting of genetic isolates, including viruses. Rule 27
of Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) permits
patenting of ‘biological material which is isolated from its natural environment. . . even if it previously occurred in nature,’ including ‘a microbiological or other technical process’ (European
Patent Convention 2016). Nonetheless, a 2015 empirical study of
patenting in this area showed its practical effects to be modest
(Liddicoat, Whitton and Nicol 2015).
More controversially, virologists have also begun to patent
genetic sequences to recently discovered pathogenic viruses,
valuable to vaccine development. Peter K. Yu has documented
competing patent claims to the sequence of SARS-CoV in the
early 2000s (Yu 2013). Researchers have also attempted to patent

the sequence of MERS-CoV (Bollinger 2015). And recent work by
Ana Santos Rutschman has shown that patents are at least partially to blame for the delay in the introduction of Ebola and Zika
virus vaccines (Rutschman 2018). This work and others demonstrate patents’ importance, and drawbacks, as tools for research
and development of viruses.

ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS
Antimicrobials—chemicals that destroy or inhibit the growth of
microbiological agents—serve as both research tools and human
therapies. They can provide selective pressure on recombinant
bacteria and halt viral reproduction. Their overuse, however, has
contributed to the global phenomenon of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the immunity of pathogenic agents to once-useful
therapies (O’Neill 2016). AMR will arguably be the most difficult public health problem of the twenty-first century, what the
World Health Organization calls an ‘apocalyptic fantasy’ (WHO
2014).
To that end, public policy has widely encouraged the development of new anti-AMR technologies. Rule 27(c) of Article 52 of
the EPC specifically contemplates the patentability of products
of microbial processes (EPC 2016). And the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued guidelines explicitly permitting patents
covering structural variants of naturally occurring compounds
(USPTO 2014).
And yet, patent incentives appear to be doing a poor job of
encouraging the development of AMR technologies. Only two
new classes of antibacterials—daptomycin, a lipopeptide, and
linezolid, an oxazolidinone—have been approved by regulatory
agencies since 1998 (Spellberg et al. 2004). And while there is
a slate of antimicrobial drugs currently being developed, AMR
technologies experienced a research desert for at least a decade,
in the 1990s (Spellberg et al. 2004).
It is unclear whether this lack of success is rooted in policy or the science of AMR. Disconcertingly, the 2016 O’Neill
Report on AMR—commissioned by the Wellcome Trust and
the United Kingdom Department of Health—suggested the latter. Among many causes for the lack of development, the Report concluded that the “low-hanging fruit’ of easily-isolated
natural antibiotic products is gone and early genomic screening techniques. . . failed to deliver on their promise of a revolution in antibiotic discovery’ (O’Neill 2016). Nonetheless, the
Report also ignited some hope that new regulatory and legal incentive policies—including modifications to the patent
regime—could rekindle private interest in anti-AMR development.
Thus far, governments have bet on hope. Europe has placed
significant resources toward a worldwide AMR surveillance network (Morrissey et al. 2013). Further, the European Academies
Science Advisory Council and the Federation of European
Academies of Medicine have proposed both Europe-wide and
domestic policies to combat AMR (van der Meer and Charpentier
2016). The United States, meanwhile, recently enacted the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act, providing extended regulatory exclusivity periods for new classes of antibiotics (Brown
2013). In addition, CARB-X, a $350 million USD project directed
by Boston University professor Kevin Outterson, has recently
been created to establish public-private partnerships and research grants focused on creating first-in-class antibacterials
(Outterson et al. 2016). Time will tell whether these economic
incentives are successful to spur development of new AMR
technologies.
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research (van Overwalle 2011). And while the United States does
not have such an exception, many American researchers obtain
plasmid constructs of CRISPR components through AddGene,
a nonprofit organization that provides reagents and academic
patent licenses to research institutions. AddGene has depository
agreements, too, with many European academic institutions—
268 as of this writing (AddGene). Lastly, the Broad Institute has
submitted some of its patents to a ‘patent pool,’ a group of
patents that can be fairly and collectively licensed by those interested in developing the technology, although the success of
this project remains uncertain (Mika 2017).
At the same time, patent issues surrounding CRISPR make
commercial research more difficult. Patent disputes have likely
given some developers pause (Kolker 2016). For-profit surrogate
companies, like the Broad Institute’s Editas Medicine, simultaneously compete in the therapeutic development market and
control a large swath of commercial patent licenses (Contreras
and Sherkow 2017). Microbiologists have the unenviable task of
navigating these patent licenses should they wish to develop
CRISPR for therapeutic products.
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Microbial technologies are diverse, and so are issues concerning their patenting. The outlook for new microbial technologies
depends as much on the consistency of patent protection as
the underlying science. CRISPR, for example, enjoys enormous
popularity among scientists and industry researchers alike—so
much so, that its development rapidly continues despite serious concerns over patent ownership and licensing (Contreras
and Sherkow 2017). Patents complicate the development of viral vectors, on the other hand, bringing significant uncertainty
to their development and, in some cases, social condemnation
(Rutschman 2018). And yet, patents alone do not appear to be doing enough to encourage development of new AMR technologies
(Outterson et al. 2016). These differences suggest that the development of future microbial technologies will depend on human
laws as much as Nature’s.
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